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AT TAINDER AND AMENDMENT 2: ROMER'S 
RIGHTNESS 
Akhil Reed Amar* 
[T]he principle underlying the Court's opinion is that one who is ac­
corded equal treatment under the laws, but cannot as readily as others 
obtain preferential treatment under the laws, has been denied equal pro­
tection of the laws. If merely stating this alleged "equal protection" vio­
lation does not suffice to refute it, our constitutional jurisprudence has 
achieved terminal silliness. 
- Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting in Romer v. Evans1 
Call me silly. In fact, call me terminally silly. For despite Justice 
Scalia's remarkably confident claim, I believe, and shall try to prove be­
low, that the Romer Court majority opinion invalidating Colorado's 
Amendment 2 was right both in form and in substance, both logically 
and sociologically. I stress "form" and "logic" at the outset because I 
share Justice Scalia's belief in the importance of these things in consti­
tutional adjudication. I also share his commitment to constitutional text, 
history, and structure, and his suspicion of "free-form" constitutional­
ism.2 And so I shall .highlight the text, history, and spirit of a constitu­
tional clause that - though not explicitly invoked by the Romer major­
ity - clarifies and supports the majority's theory: the Article I, section 
10 Attainder Clause.3 My claim is not that the Equal Protection Clause, 
relied upon by the Romer Court, was incapable of doing the work; but 
that the sociology and principles underlying the Attainder Clause 
* Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1984, Yale. - Ed. I 
thank Bruce Ackennan, Vlk Amar, Jack Balkin, Guido Calabresi, Steve Calabresi, 
Owen Fiss, Joe Goldstein, Leslie Hakala, Erez Kalir, Neal Katya!, Renee Lettow, Sandy 
Levinson, Burke Marshall, Larry Tribe, Evan Wolfson, and Kenji Yoshino for their 
helpful comments. 
1. 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1630 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
2. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free­
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HAR.v. L. REv. 1221 (1995). In this 
article Professor Tribe suggests that in some of my work, I have succumbed to a "free­
fonn method" of constitutional interpretation. Id. at 1225 n.9, 1240, 1246-48, 1289-92. 
I plead not guilty. 
3. "No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder .... " U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10, 
cl. 1. A similar provision binds the federal government. See ·u.s. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 
3. 
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powerfully illuminate the facts of Romer, the opinions in Romer, and 
the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause itself.4 
I. 
In Romer, the United States Supreme Court struck down the fol­
lowing words - which had been adopted by a 1992 statewide referen­
dum as an amendment to the Colorado Constitution - as unconstitu­
tional on their face: 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orienta­
tion. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or depart­
ments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or 
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordi­
nance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, 
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the ba­
sis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any mi­
nority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimina­
tion. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self­
executing.5 
Justice Kennedy wrote for a six-Justice majority. Justice Scalia (joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) let fly a stinging 
dissent. 
Since Romer came down, I have had many conversations about it 
with law professors and law students across the country. The initial con­
sensus seems to be that while Justice Kennedy's language soared, Jus­
tice Scalia's logic held. Justice Kennedy won their hearts; Justice 
Scalia, their heads. 
I must confess that before I read Justice Kennedy's opinion -
which builds in part on an evocative amicus brief submitted by 
Laurence Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip Kurland, and 
Kathleen Sullivan6 - I too had great difficulty in seeing how the Colo­
rado referendum was unconstitutional. I reasoned as follows: 
It is hard to see how, under existing equal protection doctrine, a 
simple declaration that "sexual orientation is not just like race" is un­
constitutional. To be sure, a strong argument can be made that sexual 
orientation discrimination is like - indeed is itself a form of - sex 
4. For a superb analysis of Romer that complements the one I shall offer here, see 
generally Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COM· 
MENTARY (forthcoming 1996). 
5. 116  S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. Il, § 30b). 
6. Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, 
and Kathleen M. Sullivan as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Romer v. Evans, 
1 16 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Brief]. Especially important analysis 
appears id. at 6 n.2. 
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discrimination.7 But the Supreme Court has yet to see this light; and in 
any event, it has long treated sex discrimination differently from race 
discrimination. In doctrinal jargon, race discrimination requires "strict 
scrutiny" while sex discrimination generates "intermediate scrutiny. "8 
And so if the declaration "sex and sexual orientation discrimination are 
different from race discrimination" is unconstitutional under Supreme 
Court equal protection doctrine, then the Constitution itself - as con­
strued by the Supreme Court - is unconstitutional. And that idea is 
silly. Terminally. 
Thus, if Colorado's cities had never adopted ordinances requiring 
courts, in effect, to give strict scrutiny to sexual orientation discrimina­
tion, that failure to treat sexual orientation exactly. like race would not 
have been unconstitutional under Supreme Court equal protection doc-
7. True, a ban on, say, gay marriage is applied against both sexes - gay men and 
lesbian women. But a ban on interracial marriage is likewise applied against both blacks 
and whites. A ban on interracial marriage requires formal race labeling: if the bride is 
white, the groom may marry if white, but not if black. And sq the government must 
have Nuremberg-like blood codes to determine if the "octoroon" Homer Plessy is white 
or black. Similarly, a ban on gay marriage requires formal sex labeling: if the "bride" 
is a woman, the "groom" may marry if a man, but not if a woman. And here too, "oc­
toroon"-like problems emerge. What if the groom is a cross-dressing transsexual? Or 
has had (or is planning to have) a sex-change operation? Or is XXY? What if the 
"bride" is genetically male, but was born with female genitals (as sometimes happens 
naturally)? So, just as miscegenation laws were not race-blind, sexual orientation laws 
are not sex-blind. And moving beyond form to substance, the social meaning of misce­
genation laws Wll$ the legal enactment of racial hierarchy - trying to create the social 
and biological illusion of separate races (which cannot interbreed) rather than a single 
human race (which can intrabreed): real whites stick with their own kind. So too, the 
social meaning of sexual orientation discrimination is the legal enactment of chauvin­
ism: real men sleep with real women. Heterosexism is a form of sexism that perpetuates 
traditional gender roles and chauvinism just as miscegenation laws were a form of ra­
cism that perpetuated traditional race roles and white supremacy. 
These ideas are developed in more detail in Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Misce­
genation Analogy: Sodomy Laws as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE LJ. 145 (1988) and 
An�ew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Dis­
crimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197 (1994). See also Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and 
the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 187. 
8. The Court, however, has recently left the door open to the argument that sex 
discrimination should perhaps receive strict scrutiny. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 
S. Ct 1419, 1425 n.6 (1994). But even if both kinds of discrimination get strict scru­
tiny, it is hard - at least right now - to think that, say, sex-segregated bathrooms 
would stand or fall with race-segregated bathrooms. 
After its decision in Romer, the Supreme Court seemed to give even more "bite" 
to intermediate scrutiny in the V.M.I. case, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct 2264 
(1996), but even this case did not treat sex just like race. The Court did not, for exam­
ple, categorically ban all single-sex state education on the theory that separate is inher­
ently unequal. 
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trine.9 But surely if Denver, Aspen, and Boulder do enact ordinances 
treating sexual orientation like race for antidiscrimination purposes, 
these cities are not forever barred from later repealing these ordinances. 
Repeal here is a kind of state action, but not an unconstitutional kind. 
The Constitution does not require that "special" antidiscrimination 
rights, once extended, irrevocably vest via some magic and an­
tidemocratic one-way ratchet. And if Denver, Aspen, and Boulder can 
repeal these ordinances, presumably the Colorado legislature can repeal 
them by statute; and so too the people of Colorado can repeal them by 
state constitutional amendment (via initiative or referendum). To think 
otherwise is terminally silly.10 
To be sure, Colorado's Amendment 2 "entrenches" its No Strict 
Scrutiny For Sexual Orientation Discrimination Rule in the sense that 
opponents of the stingy rule can now prevail only by passing a new 
constitutional amendment rather than a local ordinance or a state stat­
ute. Passing a new constitutional amendment is of course an onerous 
task. But all constitutional provisions entrench in this sense. The Strict 
Scrutiny For Race Discrimination Rule in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
as construed by the Supreme Court, itself entrenches in just this way. 
Opponents of this federal rule can now prevail only by passing a new 
federal constitutional amendment (rather than a state law or congres­
sional statute). And, of course, it is notoriously tough to pass a new fed­
eral constitutional amendment. But surely that entrenchment does not 
make the Fourteenth Amendment itself unconstitutional. To think it 
does would be terminally silly. 
The Denver, Aspen, and Boulder ordinances repealed by Amend­
ment 2, however, did more than prohibit government from discriminat­
ing on the basis of orientation. The ordinances also prohibited certain 
forms of private discrimination - in employment and in housing, for 
example. But surely the cities were not constitutionally obliged to pass 
these private discrimination codes. The federal Constitution generally 
does not require that the government prohibit private discrimination. If 
it did, the "state action" requirement of the Equal Protection Clause -
which bans government discrimination but not private discrimination -
9. Imagine, for example, a city college aff"rrmative action plan for gays. A race­
based affirmative action policy would require strict scrutiny; but must sexual orientation 
be treated just like race here under Court precedents? 
10. But cf. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. l ,  458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). On purely 
formal grounds, these cases are hard to understand. Perhaps the best way to make sense 
of them is that they frown on the entrenchment of racial segregation and on excessive 
racial polarization of populist politics; and they reflect suspicion of "gerrymandered" 
procedural rules treating racial issues differently from other political issues. 
October 1996] Romer' s Rightness 207 
would itself be unconstitutional. And that idea would be - well, you 
get the point. For the reasons we have already seen, repeal is no differ­
ent from failure to enact; and neither is repeal by dint of an "en­
trenching" constitutional amendment. 
II. 
How did Justice Kennedy's majority opinion deal with all this? 
Largely by side-stepping it through a more careful reading of Amend­
ment 2, in a formal and textual analysis that should have commanded 
the respect, if not the assent, of a principled formalist/textualist like Jus­
tice Scalia. Beyond this formal and textual analysis - which paid the 
Colorado electorate the high compliment of taking their words seriously 
- Justice Kennedy's opinion showed remarkable sensitivity to the 
mean purpose and dark social meaning lurking beneath these words. 
Amendment 2, Justice Kennedy argued, did not merely declare that 
sexual orientation is not like race. Strictly speaking, it did not address 
sexual orientation per se. Rather, it explicitly singled out for disfavored 
treatment "homosexual, lesbian [and] bisexual orientation." Twice the 
Amendment used these words, once in its caption. Under Amendment 
2, heterosexuals could win local ordinances and state laws protecting 
themselves from being discriminated against on the basis of their sexual 
orientation, but nonheteros could not win symmetric ordinances and 
laws. This point is not purely theoretical but palpably real. Amendment 
2 did not repeal Denver's, Aspen's, and Boulder's ordinances in toto, 
but only insofar as these ordinances protected homosexuals, lesbians, 
and bisexuals from orientation discrimination. Under the Boulder Code 
(as modified by Amendment 2), Boulder was not permitted to discrimi­
nate against heteros on the basis of their orientation, but homos and bis 
were shut out of this Code's sympathetic protection. Under Denver law 
(as modified by Amendment 2), a gay apartment complex owner was 
barred from posting a "For Rent - No Straights" sign; but a straight 
apartment complex owner was free to post a "For Rent-No Queers" 
sign. Thus, if a plaintiff filed a complaint that defendant fired her be­
cause of her sexual orientation, a judge following both state and local 
law would have been obliged to ask her to amend her complaint by stat­
ing her orientation; and if she answered "gay," the judge would have 
been obliged to rule against her on this ground alone. 
Beneath this formal inequality - this exclusion from the law's 
protections because of who gays are - lurked substantive inequality, 
Kennedy argued. The Amendment itself, in its social meaning, was a 
kind of "No Queers" sign writ large. Its caption, "No Protected Status 
Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation," came un-
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comfortably close to "No Protect[ion for] Homosexual[s], Lesbian[s] or 
Bisexual[s]." It was a kind of legal and social outlawry in cowboy 
country - a targeting of outsiders, a badge of second-class citizenship, 
a tainting of queers, a scarlet Q. The queer (pun intended) language of 
Amendment 2 - its odd and obsessive singling out of all nonstandard 
sexual orientations - was a subtle cue, a Freudian slip that old fash­
ioned animus was afoot here.11 When a person blurts out the n-word, 
we wonder; when a voting district looks utterly uncouth in shape, 
judges are suspicious; 12 and eyebrows are raised when Colorado voters 
adopt an amendment that is "unprecedented in our jurisprudence."13 
m. 
Though it went unnamed in Justice Kennedy's opinion, the Attain­
der Clause of Article I, Section 10 helps clarify and illuminate his argu­
ment and, as we shall see, offers lawyers litigating gay rights cases a 
particularly rich and apt source of doctrine. Perhaps the Court omitted 
explicit mention of this Clause - and hinted at it only en passant -
because it was not explicitly invoked by the parties (or by any of the 
many amici).14 But the Supreme Court may generally affirm a correct 
disposition below on any ground. (Indeed, as we shall see, Justice 
Kennedy's opinion explicitly side-stepped the Colorado Supreme 
Court's basis for invalidating Amendment 2, and thus affirmed on an 
entirely different theory than the court below.) More important, the At­
tainder Clause, in its logic and spirit, is an early forebear of the Equal 
Protection Clause, on which the Court did lean. It is no surprise, then, 
that plaintiffs in the landmark Bolling v. Sharpe15 case - which held 
that federal actions were subject to equal protection principles - ex­
plicitly relied on the Attainder Clause of Article I, Section 9, which 
speaks specifically to federal action.16 Jim Crow laws, plaintiffs argued, 
11. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 200 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing "the Court's almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity" in light of the 
fact that the Georgia statute at issue nowhere distinguished between homosexual and 
heterosexual sodomy). 
12. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 
(1993). 
13. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996). 
14. The brief submitted by Professor Tribe and others, however, did explicitly in­
voke the related idea of outlawry, and it pointedly cited pages from a Supreme Court 
case discussing outlawry and attainder. See Brief, supra note 6, at 10-11 (citing Com­
munist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 82, 88 (1961)). 
15. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
16. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 522 (1994) (discussing the causes 
of action pied in the Bolling complaint). 
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had the purpose and effect of stigmatizing blacks - not for what they 
did, but for who they were. And that, plaintiffs argued, was a kind of 
attainder, a legislatively imposed stain and taint.17 
To see this more clearly, and to see the implications for Romer, let 
us proceed through a series of hypotheticals. 
Hypothetical One. "The Anti-Amar Law. Akhil Reed Amar shall 
be drawn, hanged, and quartered. His private parts shall be cut off, his 
blood shall be deemed corrupted, and his children shall be stripped of 
their inheritance from him." This is a textbook attainder, historically 
speaking.18 A court may impose a death sentence on a named individ­
ual, but a legislature may not. And so this law is obviously 
unconstitutional. 
In part, the nonattainder rule is rooted in narrow ideas of adjudica­
tive due process. Before a person is made to suffer a criminal sanction, 
he must have his day in court, with individual notice of the charges, an 
opportunity to be heard in his own defense, the assistance of counsel, 
the chance to confront opposing witnesses in a proceeding governed by 
proper rules of evidence and relevance, and so forth.19 Legislatures op-
17. For further elaboration of this theory, see Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional 
Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking Incorporation and Reverse Incorporation, in 
BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME 
COURT 71, 79-81 (Terry Eastland ed., 1995). See also Tribe, supra note 2, at 1298-99 
n.247 (similarly suggesting that the Bolling result could be defended on Attainder 
Clause grounds, thus avoiding the awkwardness of "reverse incorporation"). 
On the connection in Anglo-American law between attainder and notions of stain 
and taint, see 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 761 (2d ed. 1989); infra note 41. 
18. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441 (1965); 3 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES§ 1338, at 209-10 
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833); LAURENCE H. 'fRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITU­
TIONAL LAW§ 10-4, at 641-42 (2d ed. 1988). In beginning with the "paradigm case" 
under the Attainder Clause, I here follow the interpretive approach advocated by Profes­
sor Rubenfeld. See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE LJ. 
1119, 1169-73 (1995). 
My Hypothetical, though graphic, accurately represents the obvious fixation on the 
body and the private parts - the insides - of the real-life attainder victim. The typical, 
highly ritualized sentence of one attainted of treason in England was as follows: 
You are to be drawn upon a hurdle to the place of execution, and there you are to 
be hanged by the neck, and being alive cut down, and your privy-members to be 
cut off, and your bowels to be taken out of your belly and there burned, you be­
ing alive; and your head to be cut off, and your body to be divided into four 
quarters, and that your head and quarters be disposed of where his majesty shall 
think fit. 
J.H. Baker, Criminal Courts and Procedure at Common Law 1550-1800, in CRIME IN 
ENGLAND, 1550-1800, at 15, 42 (J.S. Cockburn ed., 1977). 
19. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316-18 (1946) (invalidating on At­
tainder Clause grounds a congressional act that in effect condemned three named per­
sons "without the safeguards of a judicial trial"); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 277, 323 (1867) ("A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punish-
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erating in the ordinary legislative mode do not typically abide by these 
adjudicative procedures, and so trial and sentencing by legislatures are 
banned.20 
But the nonattainder rule goes much deeper, tapping into basic 
principles of separation of powers and equal protection. Even if Con­
gress were willing to give me a hearing before attainting me, the Con­
stitution bars it from acting as a court (outside the strictly circumscribed 
impeachment process). In general, the legislature must prescribe penal­
ties generally and prospectively, behind a suitably impersonal veil of ig­
norance: "All persons who do X in the future shall be hanged." Those 
who seek to avoid the noose are thus given fair warning that they must 
refrain from conduct X. Without the nonattainder principle, the legisla­
ture could simply single out its enemies - or the politically unpopular 
- and condemn them for who they are, or for what they have done in 
the past and can no longer change. Here we see an obvious link be­
tween the nonattainder rule and the related ban on ex post facto laws. 
Indeed, in both Article I, Section 9, limiting Congress, and Article I, 
Section 10, limiting states, the Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses 
stand side-by-side. A court independent of the legislature may condemn 
a named person for what he has done in the past; courts operate retro­
spectively and specifically in discrete cases and controversies: United 
States v. Amar. But a court must treat like cases alike and may apply 
only the general criminal norms previously laid down by statute or cus­
tom, rather than whatever criminal rules the judges might prefer were 
they legislators. By separating the process of penal lawmaking and pe­
nal adjudication, the Constitution protects both liberty and equality and 
promotes the rule of law; the legislature can only prescribe new penal 
rules for all, and the judiciary can only apply pre-existing penal laws 
against named individuals.21 Both legislation and adjudication must be 
suitably impersonal. Neither legislators nor judges can punish me sim­
ply because they do not like me. 
Suppose, however, that the legislature does not itself purport to ad­
judicate guilt and impose a criminal sentence as a court, but instead 
ment without a judicial trial . . . . [T]he legislative body . . . pronounces upon the 
guilt of the party, without any of the forms or safeguards of trial . . .. "); 3 STORY, 
supra note 18, at 210-1 1;  TRIBE, supra note 18, at 641, 657-63; Charles H. Wilson, Jr., 
Comment, The Supreme Court's Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for Clarification, 54 
CAL. L. REv. 212, 242-46 (1966). 
20. On the applicability of the Attainder Clause to popular referenda, see infra 
note 59. 
21. See generally United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Note, The Bounds 
of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 
YALE LJ. 330 (1962). 
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passes a clever variant of the Anti-Amar Law: "It shall henceforth (pro­
spectively) be a (general) crime for anyone to be Akhil Reed Amar, to 
have his blood type, feelings, fingerprints, and DNA. The courts shall 
apply this (general) law and accord any defendant the traditional proce­
dural rights of notice, opportunity to be heard, counsel, confrontation, 
and so forth. Anyone found guilty of this (general) crime in court shall 
be drawn, hanged, quartered, etc." Obviously, this too is a textbook bill 
of attainder even though it purports to leave "adjudication" of the 
"crime" to independent courts. It is an attainder because, despite its 
dishonest protestations, it fails the requisite test of generality and pros­
pectivity. It makes it a capital crime to be who I am.22 Put another way, 
it wrongly designates criminals rather than crimes.23 
Hypothetical Two. "The Anti-Amar and Public Stigma Law. Akhil 
Reed Amar shall be placed in the public stocks for two hours. His pri­
vate parts shall be painted red.24 Passersby may mock, insult, and hu­
miliate him." In England, this was known as a "bill of pains and penal­
ties" because it prescribed lesser punishment than that prescribed in 
22. Thomas Wentworth, the Earl of Strafford and one of the most famous attainder 
victims ever, was beheaded in 1641, simply for being himself. For a gripping account of 
this iniquity, see ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIIB CONSTI­
TIITION OF 1787, at 109-13 (1956). 
23. My claim here is not that every attainder must be a law that makes it a crime 
to be who I am, but that every such law must be an attainder. Later, I shall generalize 
the principle by suggesting that - whatever else it might also ban --: the Attainder 
Clause frowns on all penal laws based on status or identity. 
The Attainder Clause implicates at least five basic constitutional ideals, not all of 
which are present in every attainder case. First, as we have seen, the Clause implicates 
rights of individualized adjudicatory process - due process rights of notice and the op­
portunity to be heard. Second, the Clause affirms separation of powers and rule of law 
notions of generality, prospectivity, transparency, and impersonality. Third, the Clause 
anticipates the equal protection idea banning stigmatic penalties imposed on an unpopu­
lar person or group based on status, especially when laws reflect revulsion toward im­
pure, corrupt, or degraded bodies or body parts. Fourth, the Clause, when read in light 
of its history, calls for special sensitivity and judicial skepticism when a legislature sin­
gles out political agitators or opposition speakers for disfavored treatment See Brown, 
381 U.S. at 441, 453 (invalidating, on Attainder Clause grounds, a congressional act pe­
nalizing the Communist Party by name, and noting that "political group[s] ... were the 
targets of the overwhelming majority of English and early American bills of attain­
der"); David Kairys, Note, The Bill of Attainder Clauses and Legislative and Adminis­
trative Suppression of "Subversives," 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1490, 1499 (1967); Wilson, 
supra note 19, at 235-37. Finally, the Clause reflects a libertarian scheme of checks and 
balances by preventing any single branch of government from unilaterally depriving 
persons of life, liberty, or property. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Con­
stitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1 131,  1 194 (1991). In the Hypotheticals that follow, I shall es­
pecially pursue the second, third, and fourth strands noted above. 
For a superb general treatment of the Attainder Clause from which I have greatly 
profited, see TRIBE, supra note 18, §§ 10-4 to -6. 
24. See supra note 18. 
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Hypothetical One.25 But American Attainder Clause jurisprudence has 
long recognized - in an unbroken line of cases stretching back to 
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck - that legislatures 
may not pass such laws singling out named persons for abuse.26 
Hypothetical Three. "The Amar Outlawry Law. Akhil Reed Amar 
is declared an outlaw. He is cast out of the law's protection. He is now 
a stranger to our laws, an unwelcome outsider. Passersby may treat him 
as a wild beast and may hunt him for sport and kill him without pen­
alty." Historically, this is a textbook bill of outlawry. To be an outlaw is 
to be cast out of the protection of law.27 And outlawry reminds us that 
the law protects against private as well as public injuries and assaults. 
In our jurisprudence, it is obvious that a legislative declaration of out­
lawry violates the nonattainder principle.28 
Note how, by merely "targeting" certain individuals, the govern­
ment can often count on private citizens to pull the trigger. Thus, in 
1794 James Madison objected to a congressional resolution that did no 
more than declare that certain specified persons were involved in an in­
surrection: "It is in vain to say that this indiscriminate censure is no 
punishment. If it falls on classes, or individuals, it will be a severe pun­
ishment. ... Is not this proposition, if voted, a vote of attainder?"29 
Hypothetical Four. "The Amar Ineligibility Law. Akhil Reed Amar 
shall be ineligible to be a government employee or a union leader." The 
legislatively prescribed disadvantages heaped upon a named person here 
are obviously less severe than in Hypotheticals One and Three. But if 
25. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 441-42 ("The 'bill of pains and penalties' was identi­
cal to the bill of attainder, except that it prescribed a penalty short of death, e.g. banish­
ment, deprivation of the right to vote, or exclusion of the designated party's sons from 
Parliament."); see also 3 STORY, supra note 18, at 209-10; TRIBE, supra note 18, at 
641-42. 
26. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 447-49 ("what were known at common law as bills of 
pains and penalties are outlawed by the Bill of Attainder Clause"); United States v. 
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 3 15-18  (1946) ("Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of 
attainder include bills of pains and penalties.") (quoting Cummins v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867)); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138-39 (1810) (dic­
tum) ("A bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his 
property, or may do both."); see also 3 STORY, supra note 18, at 210-1 1;  TRIBE, supra 
note 18, at 642-43. 
27. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *283-84; see also 4 id. at *319-
20. 
28. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. l, 82, 88 
(1961). 
29. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794). For more recent discussions of how legisla­
tive and executive blacklists encouraging private reprisals offend the nonattainder prin­
ciple, see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 142-44 (1951) 
(Black, J., concurring); Kairys, supra note 23, at 1510-11 .  
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the purpose and social meaning of our ineligibility law is to stigmatize 
or degrade a named person - to "taint" or "stain" him, or to label 
him as less worthy or deserving of less respect or trust than his fellow 
citizens - then it should be treated like Hypothetical Two: as a bill of 
pains and penalties that offends the nonattainder principle. And so the 
Supreme Court held in landmark cases dealing with government em­
ployment (United States v. Lovett30) and union leadership (United 
States v. Brown31). 
A law naming persons and singling them out for distinctive treat­
ment is suspicious. Not all such laws are unconstitutional, however. For 
example, a law giving Akhil Reed Amar a special benefit would proba­
bly not violate the nonattainder principle, although at some point spe­
cial privilege laws could raise questions under the Title of Nobility 
Clauses and more general equal protection and republican government 
principles.32 Special privilege laws - private bills in the immigration 
context, targeted tax benefits in omnibus revenue bills, and so on - are 
commonplace.33 But as the landmark Chadha case makes clear, a law 
singling out Jagdish Chadha for disfavored immigration treatment is 
very different from a law
' 
singling him out for favored immigration 
treatment.34 As Justice Powell's Chadha concurrence explained, the 
anti-Jagdish Chadha action reflected in Congress's legislative veto was 
30. 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (invalidating, on Attainder Clause grounds, a congres­
sional act disqualifying three named suspected subversives from federal employment). 
31. 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (invalidating, on Attainder Clause grounds, a congres­
sional act targeted at Communist Party by name and disqualifying members of named 
party from union leadership positions). These cases build on landmark Attainder Clause 
cases a century earlier, invalidating laws that rendered certain described (but not 
named) former Confederate sympathizers ineligible to occupy certain professions of 
honor. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 
U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867). Garland was only the third case in U.S. history in which the 
Supreme Court held an act of Congress unconstitutional. Marbury and Dred Scott were 
the first and second. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
32. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (prohibiting federal titles of nobility); U.S. 
CONST. art. I § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting state titles of nobility); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 
(Republican Government Clause); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Equal Protection 
Clause). For a general discussion of the equality ideal underlying Republican Govern­
ment, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular 
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. R.Ev. 749 
(1994). 
33. Especially, it seems, in New Orleans. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 
427 U.S. 297 (1976) (special privileges for selected vendors); Kotch v. Board of River 
Port Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (19f7) (nepotism in river boat pilot licensing); The 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (butcher monopoly). 
34. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 n.9 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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indeed a violation of the nonattainder principle.35 Justice Powell's anal­
ysis holds even if we see deportation suspension and government em­
ployment as "privileges" rather than "rights." When the legislature 
singles out named persons for ineligibility for a generally available 
"privilege," courts should be very suspicious. 
Perhaps not all such ineligibility laws are always unconstitutional. 
In some cases, perhaps a particularly good reason exists for a narrow, 
limited, and precisely targeted ineligibility. But the logic here is not that 
the nonattainder right is sometimes outweighed; rather, it is that the 
right is sometimes not violated. We have gone beyond the narrow 
nonattainder rule (Hypothetical One) to the broader nonattainder princi­
ple that the rule exemplifies (Hypothetical 'I\vo, for example). This 
broader principle focuses on whether the legislatively prescribed ineligi­
bility is indeed a kind of pain or penalty or badge of opprobrium.36 If 
not - if no real legislative animus exists - a narrow ineligibility 
might pass muster. 
As the union leadership example makes clear, ineligibility for ben­
efits or privileges in the private sector - a kind of petty outlawry -
can also offend the nonattainder principle. 
Hypothetical Five. "The Amar Clan Ineligibility Law. Akhil Reed 
Amar and his forty-nine closest relatives shall be ineligible to be gov-
35. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 962 (Powell, J., concurring). The Chadha majority did 
not reach the attainder issue but did quote Attorney General Robert Jackson's condem­
nation of a bill that would have required a single named person's deportation as "an 
historical departure from an unbroken American practice and tradition." 462 U.S. at 
935 n.8 (majority opinion). Sitting on the Ninth Circuit in 1980, then-Judge Kennedy -
who would later assume Justice Powell's seat on the Supreme Court - invalidated the 
Chadha legislative veto on general separation of powers grounds, and noted that the 
treatment Jagdish Chadha received also raised "serious bill of attainder and equal pro­
tection problems." INS v. Chadha, 634 F.2d 408, 435 & n. 42 (9th Cir. 1980). 
36. See generally Dent v. West Vrrginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889); Hawker v. 
New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 453-54 (1965); 
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). In Dent and Hawker, the 
Court upheld the power of the state to define qualifications reasonably related to profes­
sional fitness. In neither case did the state single persons out for their political activity 
or limit their political rights. In Brown, the law did target a reviled political group -
the Communist Party - by name, and the Court viewed the law far more skeptically 
and invalidated it In Nixon, the Court held that a law that singled out Richard Nixon by 
name for distinctive treatment responded reasonably to unique issues raised by his Pres­
idency, and that this distinctive treatment was not penal, punitive, or dishonoring, as ev­
idenced by a willingness to compensate Nixon for any property taken from him. Note 
also that attainder principles may be at their low ebb where Presidents are concerned, in 
light of certain judicial powers vested in Congress in various impeachment clauses. 
Even after he left office, Richard Nixon was probably subject to impeachment and dis­
qualification from future officeholding; and Congress perhaps could legislate to prevent 
destruction of any papers that might relate to impeachability. 
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ernment employees or union leaders." This law simply compounds the 
wrong of Hypothetical Four. It effectively attaints - tars, stains - fifty 
persons rather than one; it is fifty attainders rolled into a single bill. 
And the fact that it does not quite mention forty-nine by name does not 
save it.37 It targets specific persons for who they are. It penalizes them 
for their status, not their conduct.38 It unconstitutionally treats persons 
as having "corrupt blood." 
Hypothetical Six. "The Indian-American Ineligibility Law. All 
Americans of East Indian descent shall be ineligible to be government 
employees or union leaders." This law offends a deep principle of the 
Attainder Clause and shows how the Clause is indeed a prototype of the 
Equal Protection Clause. If Colorado may not attaint fifty persons on 
the basis of their status, neither may it attaint fifty thousand.39 Here too 
the greater numbers merely compound the constitutional wrong. 
We can now see why pre-Bolling civil rights crusaders reached for 
the Article I, Section 9 Attainder Clause as a powerful weapon against 
federal discrimination against blacks.40 On this theory, even under the 
original Constitution, Congress would have been barred from adopting a 
statute captioned "An Act to Degrade and Humiliate Free Blacks in the 
District of Columbia. "41 And, of course, that is what Jim Crow in 
Washington, D.C., was in 1954. Supporters of the old order denied this, 
37. See 8 Will. 3,.ch. 5 (1696) (attainder by description of "such persons" in­
volved in an assassination plot); 26 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (priv.) (1534) (attainting "all suche 
persons" who confederated with Thomas Fitzgerald, the Earl of Kildare); Brown, 381 
U.S. at 461 (invalidating as a bill of attainder a law that inflicted deprivation upon the 
membership of the Communist Party rather than upon a list of named individuals); see 
also Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1869) (invalidating, on Attain­
der Clause grounds, a law that targeted former Confederate sympathizers, .but not by 
name); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867) (similar). 
38. Cummings, Garland, and Brown all involved laws that penalized prior political 
activity or sympathy; these ex post facto penalties were thus status-based at the time of 
enactment, with legislators heaping disabilities on a fixed class. 
39. If a law that says "all members of the Amar Clan are deemed criminals" is an 
impermissible attainder, so is one that says "all members of the Indian race are deemed 
criminal." See Brown, 381 U.S. at 461 (invalidating, on Attainder Clause grounds, a 
law that punished the Communist Party by name - a party with thousands of members 
- and noting that it "was not uncommon for English acts of attainder to inflict their 
deprivations upon relatively large groups of people, sometimes by description rather 
than name"). Cummings and Garland, of course, also invalidated attainder laws penal­
izing vast groups of former Confederate sympathizers. See Cummings, 71 U.S. ( 4 Wall.) 
at 323 (noting that a bill of attainder "may be directed against a whole class") .. 
40. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
41. Cf. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *381 ("He is then called attaint, attinc­
tus, stained or blackened. He is no longer of any credit or reputation; he cannot be a 
witness in any court . . . ") (emphasis altered). Under the infamous Black Codes of 
the 1860s, blacks were indeed barred from testifying in court because of their black and 
"degraded" character. 
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but the true social meaning of these laws was apparent to honest ob­
servers in 1954, if not in 1896.42 And the key question about segrega­
tion - is it really equal, or does it create two classes, one superior and 
one inferior? - is roughly the same whether we employ the nonat­
tainder principle or the equal protection principle. 
It might be thought that this argument proves too much. Under this 
account of the true spirit of the nonattainder principle, wasn't slavery 
unconstitutional from the outset? For surely punishing a person - by 
effective iife imprisonment - merely because he was born to a slave 
mother seems an obvious status-based punishment. Yet surely slavery 
was constitutional in 1789, wasn't it? 
There are two responses here. The first, technical response is to 
distinguish between slaves and all free persons, including free blacks. 
Slaves were by definition deemed outside the constitutional compact -
beyond the Constitution's protections. Constitutionally speaking, they 
were akin to outlaws who indeed could be treated as wild beasts. But as 
Justice Curtis proved decisively in his Dred Scott dissent,43 free blacks 
were, from the Founding on, very much part of "We the People." They 
were citizens in free states where at times they voted, served in militias, 
held offices of honor, and so on. 
The second, more candid response is that slavery was inconsistent 
with the spirit of the Attainder Clause - and with the spirit of many 
other provisions too, from due process of law to republican government. 
But these principles were implicitly limited by the Constitution's tacit 
approval of slavery in other clauses: the reference to "other" persons in 
the Article I Apportionment Clause, the Article N Fugitive Slave 
Clause, and so on.44 In the long run, Americans could not live with 
these contradictory premises - with a country and Constitution half­
slave and half-free. And so after the Civil War, the Constitution worked 
itself pure with amendments that abolished slavery and reconfirmed the 
truest meaning of the freedom principles embodied in the Attainder, 
Due Process, Republican Government, and other Clauses. 
What about women? From the Founding on, they too were subject 
to status-based, legislatively imposed disabilities of all sorts - legal in­
eligibility to act as lawyers, for example. Why didn't these disabilities 
violate the nonattainder principle? The nonanachronistic answer is that 
42. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 
YALE LJ. 421 (1960). 
43. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 572-73 (1857) (Curtis, J., 
dissenting). 
44. See generally Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's 
Thesis on the Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 V AND. L. REV. 93 (1989). 
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earlier generations (of men at least) would have indignantly denied that 
the purpose and social meaning of these laws was to degrade, oppress, 
abuse, humiliate, or stigmatize on the basis of status. These laws re­
flected not hostility or revulsion towards women, but respect for their 
separate, equal - indeed noble! - but different sphere. These laws did 
not seek to make women unequal; they simply recognized God-given 
difference. Such was, in Justice Bradley's confident phrase, "the law of . 
the Creator."45 Today, of course, we know better,46 and modem courts 
have indeed invalidated legislatively imposed, status-based disabilities 
heaped upon women. Although modem courts have invalidated these 
laws under the banner of equal protection, some of the work could well 
have been done under the nonattainder principle. 
Hypothetical Seven. "The Queer Ineligibility Law. No person of 
homosexual or bisexual orientation shall be eligible to be a governmen­
tal employee or a union leader." If Hypothetical Six violates the nonat­
tainder principle, so does Hypothetical Seven, and for the same reason: 
the statute impermissibly singles out persons for disfavored treatment 
based on their status.47 
Note how this law targets persons for who they are, not for what 
they do. Whether one's sexual "orientation" is fixed by genes, or is de­
veloped in childhood, or is even more plastic,48 "orientation" is a mat-
45. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., 
concurring). 
46. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 4 1 1  U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (plurality 
opinion). 
47. It might be argued that these two Hypotheticals are different because a person 
cannot easily hide the fact that she is Indian American, but she can hide the fact that 
she is queer. But this argument flies in the face of Cummings, Garland, and Brown. 
Whether a person is a former Confederate or Communist sympathizer is not etched on 
his face. Ex-rebs, ex-Commies, and queers can all try to "pass." Indeed, the very abil­
ity to hide one's heart or one's past can create a special measure of social anxiety about 
the hidden "enemy within" - a fifth column of body-snatching pod people who could 
be anywhere, even next door. See also supra note 37 (discussing English attainders by 
description in situations where attainder targets might be able to "pass"). 
The ability of gays to "pass" and "hide" suggests that they are not quite like 
blacks, who help define the paradigm case for Equal Protection Clause analysis. Cf. 
Frontiero, 41 1 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion) (stressing "the high visibility of the sex 
characteristic" to justify heightened equal protection scrutiny of sex discrimination). 
But under the Attainder Clause, the paradigm cases in the Supreme Court have indeed 
involved groups that can "pass" and "hide." So, here we see the special aptness of the 
Attainder Clause in thinking about the plight of queers. For a sensitive analysis of visi­
bility and the gay closet, see Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument 
for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. R.Ev. (forthcoming Nov. 1996). 
48. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique 
of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. R.Ev. 503 (1994); Janet E. Halley, The 
Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Iden­
tity, 36 UCLA L. R.Ev. 915 (1989) [hereinafter Halley, Closet]. 
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ter of one's inner life and not merely one's outer conduct.49 Orientation 
encompasses desires, fantasies, thoughts, urges, and drives that one 
often cannot prevent or control - even if one can resist these impulses 
in one's external behavior. A bedrock tenet of Anglo-American law is 
that punishment can occur only after offending conduct. It cannot be a 
crime simply to be, or merely to think or feel.50 We do not punish or 
publicly stigmatize a person simply because he has "corrupt blood" or 
impure thoughts51 - because he has an involuntary erection or because 
she feels wet inside.52 Once a person has violated a legitimate criminal 
law by his conduct, his intent and predispositions may be relevant to 
punishment and deterrence. But predisposition alone can never suffice. 
Our system does not tolerate a scheme of zero strikes and you're out ­
or zero strikes if you're "out." 
And so even if some forms of sexual conduct may be criminalized 
- anal sexual intercourse, for example53 - mere sexual orientation 
may not be. No clause makes this more clear than the Attainder Clause: 
it cannot be a crime simply to be who you are.54 
49. But cf. infra note 124. 
50. See Robinson v. California. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that addiction itself 
- as opposed to drug use - cannot be made a crime). 
51. To the extent that orientation derives from thoughts, these thoughts - even (or 
especially) if consciously summoned up or expressed to others - also implicate First 
Amendment protections. See Halley, Closet, supra note 48, at 966-76; cf. Cummings v. 
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 318 (1867) (registering special concern under the At­
tainder Clause about a loyally oath "directed not merely against overt and visible acts 
of hostilily to the government, but . . .  to . • .  words, desires, and sympathies, also"). 
52. I use blunt language here to highlight the innerness and the embodied quality 
of some aspects of sexuality. Surely, the law does not belong in this place, and the leg­
islature may not condemn a person's very body as morally tainted. 
53. We shall return to this issue later. 
54. Another closely related constitutional provision, the Treason Clause, prevents 
punishing political opponents for their mere thoughts - imagining the President's 
death, for example - and instead requires proof of overt, willful acts of aggression 
against one's countrymen. See U.S. CONST. art. ID, § 3. On the historical linkage be­
tween attainder and treason, see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441, 453 (1965); 
see also William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of 
Expression, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 91, 97-108 (1984) (discussing Treason Clause's rejec­
tion of English laws punishing "constructive treason" of "imagining" or "compas­
sing" the King's death). The linkage between the Treason Clause and the Attainder 
Clause is not merely historical and structural, but textual too: "no Attainder of Treason 
shall work Corruption of Blood." U.S. CONST. art. ID, § 3. For a thoughtful discussion, 
see Max E. Stier, Note, Co"uption of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of the 
Parents Should Not Matter, 44 STAN. L. REv. 727 (1992). 
There is an obvious analogy between unorthodox religious and political thoughts 
that outraged the Establishment 250 years ago and heretical sexual fantasies that outrage 
the Orthodox today - "compassing" the death of traditional sex roles and the Hetero­
sexual Order. 
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Hypothetical Eight. "The Queer Discrimination Amendment. No 
person of homosexual or bisexual orientation shall be eligible �o secure 
a local ordinance or state law prohibiting public or private discrimina­
tion on the basis of sexual orientation." For our purposes, this law is re­
ally no different from Hypothetical Seven. In both cases, queers are de­
clared ineligible for things that everyone else is eligible for. The only 
difference is the form of ineligibility. In Hypothetical Seven it was pub­
lic and private employment, and here it is legislation prohibiting public 
and private discrimination. 
There may be no substantive constitutional right either to certain 
jobs or to certain anti-discrimination laws; but there is an equality right 
to get the same benefits that one's fellow citizens can get. Under the 
nonattainder principle, there is a right not to be singled out by name in 
a law that, metaphorically speaking, paints one's private parts red.55 
Attainders are both intensely personal and obviously political; and 
the intertwining of the personal and the political is of course an impor­
tant insight of feminists and gay rights advocates. My exposition has 
featured intensely personal Hypotheticals precisely to highlight the per­
sonal and private affront of a public law that names and shames. (You 
are invited to substitute your own name to try to imagine what a law 
like Hypothetical Eight might feel like to those named and targeted by 
it.) 
Gay rights advocates also have tried to suggest that, in queer lives, 
equality concerns, issues of bodily integrity and privacy, and the rights 
of thought and expression tightly intertwine.56 But constitutional litiga­
tion tends to pry these apart, pressing litigants to bend their pleas into 
either an equal protection formula, a substantive due process argument, 
or a First Amendment claim. The text, history, and sociology of the At­
tainder Clause, by contrast, may liberate litigants to reunite these inter­
twined concerns: attainders are all about equality, bodies, and expres­
sion.57 And so for some problems - like Hypothetical Eight - the 
SS. On the ways in which such government-painted bull's-eyes can invite private 
punishment, see supra note 29 and accompanying text Cf. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the 
Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431 (1992) (arguing that the coded social 
meaning of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), was to declare open season on, 
and invite private violence against, queers). Gays are, apparently, disproportionately 
victims of violent bashings, whose embodied goriness recalls that of historic attainders. 
See supra note 18. For a rich discussion of the ways in which Nazi laws in effect 
painted pink triangles on gays, see Yoshino, supra note 47. 
S6. See Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 19 VA. L. REv. 169S 
(1993). 
S7. And about dishonor, too. Cf. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 
320 (1866) (stressing that "liberty" encompasses "freedom from outrage on the feel­
ings as well as restraints on the person"). 
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Attainder Clause may be a particularly apt tool of analysis.58 
Of course, Hypothetical Eight is not really hypothetical. It is essen­
tially Colorado's Amendment 2.59 Shorn of words unnecessary for pres­
ent purposes, Amendment 2 reads as follows: 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual 
Orientation. [No state agency or municipality shall] enforce any . . .  pol­
icy whereby homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation . . .  shall . . •  
entitle any person [so oriented] to [a] claim of [orientation] 
discrimination. 
These words are unconstitutional on their face. They are, as Justice 
Kennedy wrote, a violation of constitutional principles "in the most lit­
eral sense. "60 It is as if Colorado passed an Amendment captioned: "An 
Amendment to Violate the Equal Protection and Nonattainder Princi­
ples." Or, to take another real-life example, these words recall the hap­
lessly worded policy once adopted by the Los Angeles International 
Airport banning all "First Amendment activities" - a nobrainer invali­
dated by the Supreme Court 9-0 in 1987 in an eight-page opinion au­
thored by Justice O'Connor.61 
To be sure, the clearly unconstitutional thread of Amendment 2 
was entangled in all sorts of other knotty verbiage. But the Colorado 
Supreme Court showed no inclination to unravel this mess or rewrite 
58. Not surprisingly, the Attainder Clause has been raised in various recent lower 
court cases involving gay rights. See, e.g., Richenberg v. Perry, 909 F. Supp. 1303, 1314 
(D. Neb. 1995); Walmer v. United States Dept. of Defense, 835 F. Supp. 1307, 1314-15 
(D. Kan. 1993), affd., 52 F.3d 851,  855 (10th Cir. 1995) cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 474 
(1995); Meinhold v. United States Dept. of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1453, 1455 (C.D. 
Cal. 1992), modified and vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994). In Walmer and 
Richenberg, the courts rejected Attainder Clause claims. In Meinhold, the court issued a 
preliminary injunction against the U.S. Navy on the ground that mandatory discharge of 
gay service members on the basis of their "sexual status" violated the Attainder Clause. 
In subsequent proceedings, however, the Attainder Clause claim apparently dropped out 
of the case. Of course, my claim here is not that the Clause is some magic bullet that 
will always win for gays, but that it is, in some cases, an especially apt tool. 
59. Amendment 2 was adopted by popular referendum, but this legislative action 
should be treated no differently from other legislative action under the Attainder Clause 
- or its companion, the Ex Post Facto Clause, for that matter. See TRIBE, supra note 
18, at 647 n.27, 658-59. Given that some of the historical and structural concerns about 
"trial by legislature" are that such trials might reflect overheated popular passions -
trials by mob - it would be odd indeed if the Clause did not apply directly to the legis­
lative acts of the populace. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 
480 & n.45 (1977); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 444 (1965); 3 STORY, supra 
note 18, at 210-11.  In fact, the Court in its first major Attainder Clause case struck 
down a state constitutional provision that had been ratified by a superheated popular 
vote. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 322-23. 
60. Romer v. Evans, 116  S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996). 
61. See Board of Airport Commr. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987). 
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the thing - severing words here or adding phrases there. And how to 
rewrite it? Should judges have extended its ban to heteros seeking anti­
discrimination protection, thus invalidating local sexual orientation laws 
in toto?62 Or should judges have let these ordinances stand while mak­
ing it clear that gays and bis should have only the same orientation dis­
crimination rights as straights but no more?63 Remember also that we 
are dealing not with a mere statute but with a state constitutional 
amendment explicitly designed to limit all branches of the Colorado 
government, including its courts. By rewriting Amendment 2 to protect 
gays and bis as such, Colorado courts would be doing precisely what 
Amendment 2 forbids.64 More generally, it is dangerous enough that 
state judges can "construe" state constitutions; should they also have 
the power to rewrite them? Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court rightly 
held that the sexual orientation language was not severable from the 
rest of Amendment 2.65 
Even more important, however, is that once judges find the rotten 
core of this law, they should throw the whole thing out as tainted.66 The 
unconstitutionality of naming some persons for disfavored treatment is 
visible in the very caption of Amendment 2. A statute that, say, used 
the word "nigger" should not be entitled to ordinary judicial deference. 
If the purpose of the Colorado electorate was so facially unconstitu­
tional in so many of its words, the other words should fall too. The ob­
vious animus of the part infects the whole. 
N. 
In light of this line of analysis, we fmally must consider two ques­
tions. First, is this really the Romer majority's theory? Second, if it is, 
what are the limiting principles of this theory, and how does it stand up 
to Justice Scalia's arguments in dissent? 
We first turn to Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. It is short and 
sweet, with noble words and no footnotes. By modem standards, it is 
relatively free of formulaic doctrinal jargon.67 More than most opinions, 
it is written for fellow citizens, and avoids intricate jousting and pointed 
62. With this approach, a city community college might have been free to adopt an 
affinnative action plan for gays. See supra note 9. 
63. With this approach, a city college could not discriminate against straights; but 
it could not discriminate against queers either. 
64. For a general treatment of this problem, see Evan H. Caminker, Note, A Norm-
Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 YALE LJ. 1 185 (1986). 
65. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1349 (Colo. 1994). 
66. See generally Caminker, supra note 64. 
67. See generally Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 
165 (1985). 
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back-and-forth exchanges with the dissenting Justices. In light of all 
this, we must read Justice Kennedy's opinion with special care, to tease 
as much meaning as possible out of his words. When we do, we see 
that there is a clear, strong, unbroken analytic and rhetorical thread that 
runs from start to finish in his opinion, and that this thread holds 
against the dissent's sharpness. 
This is not to say that Justice Kennedy's opinion is flawless at 
every turn. (How many opinions are?) It is to say that Justice Ken­
nedy's opinion reaches the right result, and for the right reason. The 
Court gets it. And this is all the more impressive given that the Court 
got so little help from the opinions below and from the parties' briefs, 
which went off on a very different theory and beckoned the Court to­
wards a veritable doctrinal swamp - especially for formalists - as we 
saw in Part I above.68 But guided in part by a suggestive amicus brief,69 
Justice Kennedy detoured around the bog and found firm, high ground. 
He begins with the following words, quoting the great dissent in 
Plessy v. Ferguson: "One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admon­
ished this Court that the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates clas­
ses among citizens.' "70 It is a nice rhetorical touch, to be sure, espe­
cially because Romer comes down 100 years - to the week - after 
Plessy. But is it more? A casual or uncharitable reader might say no: 
"What does Plessy have to do with Romer? Plessy was a race case, and 
Romer is not." But in Plessy, Justice Harlan understood that the Four­
teenth Amendment equality idea transcends "race" - a word not 
found in the Amendment. Justice Kennedy clearly understands this too. 
And what did Justice Harlan mean about "classes" in this quote? A 
critic might say that his statement was vacuous: all laws classify. But 
surely Justice Harlan knew that, and Justice Kennedy says exactly that 
later in his opinion.71 What both Harlan and Kennedy are saying, then, 
is that government may pass laws classifying conduct - if you do act 
A, you suffer consequence B - but may not create classes among citi­
zens on the basis of who they are rather than what they do. In this re­
spect, race is rather like sexual orientation in Colorado, and Jim Crow 
is relevant to Amendment 2. 
This is not the first time that Justice Kennedy has begun an opin­
ion with Plessy. He did precisely the same thing in his 1990 dissent in 
68. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10. 
69. See supra note 6. 
70. Romer v. Evans, 1 16 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
71 .  See infra text accompanying note 94. 
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Metro Broadcasting v. FCC.72 And a key concern in that dissent was 
that, under affirmative action quotas, government would be deep in the 
blood-test business - with Nuremberg-like laws classifying persons by 
their ancestry and birth, by their status rather than their conduct.73 Else­
where, Justice Kennedy has announced his attraction to color-blind con­
stitutionalism,74 and his opening reference in Romer to Justice Harlan's 
famous color-blind dissent might seem to have far-reaching implications 
for the highly charged issue of affirmative action in education. Yet sev­
eral of the Justices who joined Romer would probably allow color­
conscious affirmative action in the context of education,75 and so it 
seems a stretch to say that Romer casts doubt on Bakke.16 Interestingly, 
an Attainder Clause analysis may help explain the puzzle. As we have 
seen, a bill singling out persons or classes for special privileges does 
not invariably run afoul of the nonattainder ideal. As Justice Powell -
who authored the famous Bakke opinion upholding diversity-based af­
finnative action in education - later noted, a private bill to allow 
Jagdish Chadha to stay in the United States is different from a private 
bill to expel Jagdish Chadha from American soil.77 Singling out for in­
clusion is sometimes quite different from singling out for exclusion or 
ostracism.78 Thus, race-conscious "welcome mats" may be different 
from race-conscious "No Trespassing" signs,79 especially if the purpose 
of such mats is to heal racial division by bringing all races together to 
live with and learn from one another as democratic equals. 80 
The final drop of meaning to be squeezed from Justice Kennedy's 
opening reference to Plessy is this: like Justice Harlan, he signals here 
that he will attend to social reality as well as legal form. Justice Harlan 
knew as a human being that separate was not and would not be equal, 
and said so as a judge. Similarly, Justice Kennedy's opinion ranges be-
72. 497 U.S. 547, 631 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
73. See 497 U.S. at 633 n.1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
74. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
75. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katya!, Bakke's Fate, 43 
UCLA L. REv. 1745 (1996). 
76. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
77. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 n.9 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). 
78. On one possible view, singling out for inclusion should offend the Constitution 
only if it creates a privileged upper caste in violation of the spirit and sociology under­
lying the Title of Nobility Clauses. Sociologically, it would be stretching things to say 
that racial minorities who are given a leg up in educational affirmative action plans are 
truly an upper caste of nobility today. 
79. This language is borrowed from Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1 15 S. Ct. 
2097, 2114 (1995). It is discussed in more detail in Amar & Katya!, supra note 75. 
80. This is, of course, Justice Powell's noble vision in Bakke. For much more dis­
cussion of that vision, see Amar & Katya!, supra note 75. 
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yond text and form to ponder the exclusionary social meaning beneath 
the surface of Amendment 2. On this deeper level, the laws at issue in 
both Plessy and Romer are about untouchability and uncleanness: they 
are not like us.81 In Plessy, the marker of this untouchability was seem­
ingly trivial: blacks must ride in this car rather than that one. But Jus­
tice Harlan foresaw what bitter fruit could grow from such a seed; and 
with the benefit of this lesson, Justice Kennedy saw a seemingly small 
inequality in Romer and killed it before it could take root and spread. 
After this deft opening nod to Harlan, Justice Kennedy begins to 
narrate the history of Amendment 2 as a response to local ordinances 
prohibiting discrimination based on "sexual orientation. "82 These ordi­
nances protected all citizens. Boulder, for example, protected a person's 
"choice of sexual partners, i.e. bisexual, homosexual or heterosex­
ual."83 Denver's ordinances explicitly protected status; Justice Kennedy 
cites Denver's Code as "defining 'sexual orientation' as '[t]he status of 
an individual as to his or her heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexu­
ality.' " 84 Amendment 2, Kennedy then adds, did not repeal these ordi­
nances in toto, but only "to the extent they prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of 'homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, prac­
tices or relationships.' " 85 The issue at hand is not, then, whether sexual 
orientation can be treated differently (from, say, race); but whether gays 
and bis can be treated differently (from straights).86 
\ If Justice Kennedy's framing is not overwhelmingly clear from his 
first two paragraphs, it surely emerges in his third, where he quotes 
Amendment 2 in its entirety and pointedly describes the law as singling 
out a "named class, a class we shall refer to as homosexual persons or 
81. The ideas of degradation and impurity, of stigma and uncleanness, are more 
obvious in the text of the Attainder Clause - with its explicit focus on "tain[t]" -
" than in the more abstract language of the Equal Protection Clause. Of course, both 
Clauses, historically speaking, were tightly bound up with concerns about stigma and 
"corrupt" or "degraded" "blood." 
82. Romer v. Evans, 116  S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996). 
83. 1 16 s. Ct. at 1623 (emphasis added) (quoting BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE 
§ 12-1-1 (1987)). 
84. 116  s. Ct. at 1623 (emphasis added) (quoting DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. 
CODE art. IV, § 28-92 (1991)). 
85. 1 16 S. Ct. at 1623 (emphasis added). 
86. Cf. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power To Curtail Federal Court Jurisdic­
tion: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 917-18 
(1984) (critiquing Professor Tribe's jurisdictional gerrymandering theory, rooted in an 
analogy to Hunter v. Ericksen, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), as collapsing the distinction be­
tween laws that distinguish between litigants and laws that distinguish between subject 
matters; on Gunther's view, Congress might create a separate court for sexual orienta­
tion issues, but not for gay plaintiffs). Professor Gunther, of course, joined Professor 
Tribe's Romer brief. See supra note 6. 
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gays and lesbians."87 The word "class" here of course recalls Ken­
nedy's opening quote from Harlan in Plessy; and the word "named" 
foreshadows its use later in the opinion and strongly hints at the attain­
der idea. In his "we shall refer to" clause, Justice Kennedy in effect 
promises to keep his eye on the disadvantaged class (gays and lesbians) 
and not merely on the formal classification (sexual orientation). The re­
mainder of Kennedy's opinion redeems this promise, with its insistent 
and acute focus on the attainted persons themselves: gays and lesbians. 
In his next two paragraphs, Justice Kennedy quickly recounts the 
history of Romer as a lawsuit brought by "homosexual persons" fear­
ing discrimination "on the basis of their sexual orientation."88 The Col­
orado Supreme Court had based its holding for plaintiffs in part on the 
distinctive issues raised by Amendment 2 as a state constitutional provi­
sion bumping up certain issues from the plane of local politics to state­
wide politics. 89 But if Amendment 2 is unconstitutional because it sin­
gles out a named class of persons for status-based disadvantage, it does 
not matter whether it is a state constitution, a state statute, or a local or­
dinance. And so Justice Kennedy announces that his Court will "affirm 
the judgment, but on a rationale different from that adopted by the State 
Supreme Court. "90 
Thus ends Part I of Kennedy's opinion. The analytic linchpin of 
Part II is Justice Kennedy's claim that Amendment 2 "imposes a spe­
cial disability upon [homosexuals] alone" - a group he also refers to 
as the "targeted class."91 In a nutshell: "Homosexuals are forbidden the 
safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint. "92 
This claim is further elaborated and explored by Justice Kennedy 
in Part ill of his opinion. Early in that section he writes that Amend­
ment 2 "has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferenti­
ated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, as we shall 
explain, invalid form of legislation. "93 A careless or uncharitable critic 
might ask: What can this possibly mean? How is inability to win spe­
cial heightened scrutiny in antidiscrimination laws a "broad and undif­
ferentiated disability?" Don't many laws disadvantage one group or an­
other? Indeed, Justice Kennedy himself explicitly admits this three 
87. Romer, 1 16 S. Ct. at 1623 (emphasis added). 
88. 1 16 S. Ct. at 1624. 
89. See 1 16 S. Ct. at 1624 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993)). 
90. 1 16 S. Ct. at 1624. 
91.  116  S. Ct. at 1626 (emphasis added); cf. supra notes 29, 55 and accompanying 
text (discussing targets and bull's-eyes). 
92. 116  S. Ct. at 1627. 
93. 116  S. Ct. at 1627. 
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sentences earlier: "most legislation classifies for one purpose or an­
other, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons. "94 If 
this is so, a critic might ask: What is so "peculiar," "exceptional," and 
"invalid" about the "form" of legislation that hurts a given group? 
The answer, of course, is that Amendment 2 targets a single named 
group. This is the key word in this key sentence, echoing Kennedy's 
earlier word use. And, of course, to name a person or a group by law 
for disadvantage is an "exceptional" and "invalid" "form" of "legisla­
tion." It is a bill of attainder. 
Not all laws that name suffer this fatal flaw - only those that, in 
Kennedy's words, reflect "animus toward the class. "95 Thus, in his next 
paragraph, the Justice cites with apparent approval Kotch v. Board of 
River Port Pilot Commrs.,96 in which the Court upheld a kind of private 
bill system that in effect gave certain favored persons special pilot­
licensing privileges. Sometimes a personalized welcome mat may be 
different from a status-based "No Trespassing" sign.97 Courts must ex­
amine designer laws to ensure that they are not "drawn for the purpose 
of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law. "98 
In his next paragraph, Justice Kennedy reminds us of just how odd 
Amendment 2 is: "It identifies persons by a single trait . . . . "99 An 
obtuse critic might think that all laws do so, but most laws identify con­
duct rather than traits: if you do A, consequence B ensues. Laws based 
on traits - blood type or blood lines, left-handedness or a sweet tooth, 
sexual orientation and so on - are different; and Amendment 2 is "un­
precedented in our jurisprudence."100 
By now, of course, the point should be clear, and the remainder of 
Justice Kennedy's opinion drives it home cleanly. Here is a compressed 
version of four of his last five paragraphs: 
It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort . 
. . . [L]aws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal 
status or general hardships are rare . 
. . . [L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference 
that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of 
persons affected [ - born of] "a bare . . .  desire to harm a politically un­
popular group." 
94. 116  S. Ct at 1627. 
95. 1 16 S. Ct at 1627 (emphasis added). 
96. 330 U.S. 552 (1947). 
97. See supra note 79. 
98. Romer, 1 16 S. Ct at 1627 (emphasis added). 
99. 1 16 S. Ct. at 1628. 
100. 1 16 S. Ct. at 1628. 
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. • . Amendment 2 . . . is a status-based enactment[,] . . . a classifi­
cation of persons undertaken for its own sake . . . .  "[C]lass legislation . .  
. [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment • . . .  " 
We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to 
further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone 
else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons 
a stranger to its laws.101 
Finally, let us turn to the one paragraph omitted from this com­
pressed version of Romer's coda. In this paragraph, Justice Kennedy -
for the first and only time - turns from his main narrative to address 
the dissent directly. As we shall see in more detail below, Justice Scalia 
waves the red flag of Bowers v. Hardwick102 and dares the Court to 
charge. In effect, Scalia argues that since Colorado can criminalize 
queer sex, surely it can take the lesser step of preventing queers from 
winning antidiscrimination laws. Sodomy can be made a felony, and 
felons can be wholly disenfranchised. And so queers cannot complain if 
they are treated better than this, as they surely are in Colorado. 
The Court, however, makes no explicit reference to Bowers, lead­
ing Scalia to shout "Gotcha! ": "The case most relevant to the issue 
before us today is not even mentioned in the Court's opiniori." 103 But 
one need not cite a case to distinguish it; 104 and in a deft paragraph Jus­
tice Kennedy explains how Bowers - far from being the "case most 
relevant" - is a case not remotely relevant. Kennedy does this through 
the trope of Davis v. Beason, another off-point case dredged up by the 
dissent: 
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), not cited by the parties but relied 
upon by the dissent, is not evidence that Amendment 2 is within our con­
stitutional tradition, and any reliance upon it as authority for sustaining 
101. 1 16 S. Ct at 1628-29 (quoting United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528, 534 (1973); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883)). Note especially the 
repeated emphasis here on "status" and "class" and the rich outlawry imagery in the 
final sentence. 
102. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
103. Romer, 1 16 S. Ct at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Elsewhere Justice Scalia 
accuses tlie Court of "ignoring [the] inconvenient precedent" of Bowers. 1 1 6  S. Ct at 
1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In two other places, he notes that Bowers is "unchallenged 
here" and tliat respondents "expressly disavowed any intent" to overrule it 1 16 S. Ct 
at 1629, 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In yet another spot, he taunts tlie Court for being 
"unwilling to join" the Bowers debate. 1 16  S. Ct at 1636 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
104. Perhaps the Romer Court did not cite Bowers because some members of the 
Court now deem the case an embarrassment, just as some Founders found slavery an 
embarrassment and omitted all explicit mention of it in the Constitution. For some Jus­
tices, perhaps even to cite Bowers would have been to "distinguish" it in a different 
sense: to give it undeserved distinction and respect Or perhaps some Justices in the ma­
jority still approve of Bowers and would resist an explicitly negative "but see" citation. 
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the amendment is misplaced. . . . To the extent it held that the groups 
designated in the statute may be deprived of the right to vote because of 
their status, its ruling . . .  [is] most doubtful . • . .  [C]f. United States v. 
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) . . . .  To the extent Davis held that a con­
victed felon may be denied the right to vote, its holding is not implicated 
by our decision and is unexceptionable.105 
Look here, Justice Kennedy is saying. There is all the difference in 
the world between legislative deprivations based on status and punish­
ments based on conduct. To think otherwise is terminally silly (though 
Kennedy is far too polite to say so bluntly). Thus, whether or not cer­
tain forms of sexual conduct may be criminalized - a question the 
Court need not and therefore does not reach - mere orientation cannot 
be criminalized or used by law to disenfranchise or degrade. And lest 
anyone miss the point, the Court cites United States v. Brown, a case 
not cited by the parties or the courts below. The inclusion of Brown is 
the brainchild of the Court (as the Davis cite was Justice Scalia's idea). 
And what is Brown about? It is a landmark case invalidating a bill of 
attainder - the very case featured above in Hypothetical Four. 106 
v. 
It remains to test this theory against Justice Scalia's dissent. The 
Justice describes his own dissent as "vigorous[]," 107 and it surely is 
that. "Derisive" might be even more accurate, given its description of 
the majority opinion as "hand-wringing," "terminal[ly] sill[y]," "long 
on emotive utterance," "ridiculous," "unheard-of," "facially absurd," 
"novel and extravagant," "nothing short of insulting," and "nothing 
short of preposterous."108 What accounts for this tone? 
Just as Justice Kennedy's first sentence gives us a helpful window 
onto his own thinking, Justice Scalia's first sentence is also revealing: 
"The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite."109 The Kul­
turkampf reference reminds us of the highly charged nature of debates 
over gay rights - recalling similar culture wars over abortion and 
school prayer. And once we see this, we can see that, for Justice Scalia, 
this is deja vu all over again. In 1992, Justice Kennedy co-authored the 
opinion of the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey1 10 upholding abor­
tion rights, and Justice Scalia Goined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
105. Romer, 1 16  S. Ct at 1628 (citations omitted). 
106. Indeed, Brown is featured throughout the footnotes in Part ill. 
107. Romer, 1 16 S. Ct at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
108. 1 16 S. Ct at 1630, 1631,  1634, 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
109. 1 16 S. Ct at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1 10. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Justices Thomas and White) wrote a stinging dissent. That same year, 
Justice Kennedy authored the opinion of the Court in Lee v. Weismanm 
invalidating a high school commencement prayer, and Justice Scalia 
(joined by the same three colleagues) wrote a stinging dissent. 
It is not just that the lineups in these three cases are similar; so are 
the basic moves and tone of Justice Scalia's dissents. In Casey, he ar­
gued that the Justices were simply making things up: " [T]he Constitu­
tion says absolutely nothing about [abortion.]"112 He says the same 
thing in Romer: " [T]he Constitution of the United States says nothing 
about this subject. " 1 13 So too, Scalia's fmal paragraph in Romer -
"Today's opinion has no foundation in American constitutional law, 
and barely pretends to" 114 - recalls John Hart Ely's famous line on 
Roe: " [I]t is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an ob­
ligation to try to be." 115 To the extent Casey built on Roe, and Roe did 
not exactly build on stone, Justice Scalia had a good point in Casey. 
But not in Romer. Here, as we have seen, Justice Kennedy's opinion 
builds squarely on deep constitutional tradition and structure. Here, 
John Hart Ely supports Justice Kennedy's approach in the scholars' 
brief he co-signs. (Though nowhere cited in this brief, Ely has also au­
thored a famous student note and an important article on - you 
guessed it - the Attainder Clause.116 Ely also served as a law clerk to 
Chief Justice Warren during the term Warren handed down the Court's 
landmark Attainder Clause case, United States v. Brown1 17). 
Scalia's Romer dissent also echoes his Lee dissent. There too, Jus­
tice Kennedy wrote a clean, grand opinion with no footnotes and in a 
voice comprehensible to fellow citizens. The Justice looked beyond le­
gal form to social substance. No one is legally obliged to attend her 
high school commencement, but who would want to miss it or to feel 
excluded by a specific prayer that emotionally invites others in, but 
shuts her out?118 Peer pressure is a fact of life in high school, 1 19 and it is 
not fair to force some students to stand up for their rights by standing 
1 1 1. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
1 12. Casey, 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1 13. Romer, 1 16 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1 14. 1 16 S. Ct at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1 15. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 
YALE LJ. 920, 947 (1973) (emphasis deleted) (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 13 
(1973)). 
116. See John Hart Ely, United States v. Lovett Litigating the Separation of Pow-
ers, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1975); Note, supra note 21. 
1 17. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
1 18. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-95 (1992). 
1 19. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593-94. 
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out and apart from their classmates on a day when all should stand to­
gether. " [I]n effect," if not in form, Justice Kennedy wrote in Lee, the 
school "required participation in a religious exercise." 120 In Romer 
Kennedy says that, in effect, Colorado has singled out named persons 
for disfavored treatment. In his dissent in Lee, Justice Scalia mocked 
the Court's sensitivity to broader social meaning, suggesting that a the­
ory of "psychological coercion" was, "not to put too fine a point on it, 
incoherent."121 And in Romer he opines that the Court's portrayal of 
Coloradans as gay-bashing is "so false as to be comical."122 Even if 
Justice Scalia had a point in Lee - though I happen to think not - he 
has none in Romer. For as we have seen, Amendment 2 is formally 
flawed in a way that should be clear even to the most finicky formalist. 
It is flawed on its face - in its words, not just in their spirit. 
What are Justice Scalia's main counterarguments? At one point he 
notes that all constitutional provisions disfavor those opposed to them 
and entrench the disadvantage, forcing opponents to scale high walls: 
"The Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, for example, 
deprived those who drank alcohol not only of the power to alter the pol­
icy of prohibition locally or through state legislation, but even of the 
power to alter it through state constitutional amendment or federal leg­
islation."123 This is of course correct - it is the same point I made 
above in Part I - but it is utterly unresponsive to the unique problem 
of status-based laws. 
Elsewhere in the opinion, Justice Scalia dangerously blurs the key 
constitutional difference between status and conduct.124 He reads state 
laws prohibiting polygamy as "singl[ing] out" "those who have a po­
lygamous 'orientation.' " 125 But surely he cannot mean that these laws 
do or could punish mere orientation - a disposition, a hankering, an 
urge - without an act. 
Or can he? Consider the following passage: 
If it is rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to deny 
special favor and protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or de-
120. 505 U.S. at 594. 
121. 505 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
122. Romer v. Evans, 1 16 S. Ct 1620, 1633 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
123. 116  S. Ct. at 1634-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
124. Alas, he is not alone. See 1 16 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing va­
rious lower court opinions collapsing the obvious analytic distinction between homosex­
ual orientation and homosexual conduct). For a discussion and analysis of many of 
these cases, see Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721 (1993); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 
27 HAR.v. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 531 (1992). 
125. Romer, 1 16 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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sire to engage in the conduct. Indeed, where criminal sanctions are not 
involved, homosexual "orientation" is an acceptable stand-in for homo­
sexual conduct.126 
This is one of the most troubling passages ever to appear in mod­
em U.S. Reports. For starters, the word "special" in the first sentence is 
a cheat. The issue here is the right of gays and bis to have the same 
right against orientation discrimination enjoyed by heteros qua heteros. 
And unless all bets are off when "homosexuals" are involved, the sec­
ond sentence suggests that - as a matter of general principle - orien­
tation is an acceptable stand-in for conduct. But Scalia himself must 
know this is not the case, and so he qualifies his claim with the phrase 
"where criminal sanctions are not involved." Why? Because otherwise, 
to use orientation as a stand-in in a law would be an obvious bill of at­
tainder. But the bill of attainder principle is not limited to criminal 
cases, as is made clear in United States v. Brown121 - the very case 
featured in our Hypothetical Four and highlighted by Justice Kennedy 
in his most direct response to Justice Scalia. This is the key case - not 
Bowers - and it is Scalia - not Kennedy - who fails to engage. In­
deed, Scalia nowhere acknowledges the case. 
And in the end, what does Justice Scalia say about Bowers? He 
says that it is "unassailable" - unassailable! - that states can make 
"homosexual conduct a crime," and so "Amendment 2 is unquestiona­
bly" - unquestionably! - "constitutional as applied to those who en­
gage in homosexual conduct." 128 
But Bowers does not remotely stand for this. For starters, even 
where male-male anal sexual intercourse is involved, Bowers held only 
that criminalization did not offend substantive due process. The Court 
explicitly refused to address the equal protection issues at stake.129 This 
refusal renders Bowers highly dubious. To borrow from Yogi Berra, 
"when you reach a fork in the road, take it." Either male-female anal 
sex can be criminalized or it cannot. If it can, how exactly are the prin­
ciples of Eisenstadt130 and now Casey131 to be distinguished away? If it 
cannot, then doesn't criminalization of male-male - but not male-
126. 116  S. Ct at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
127. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). Of course, the applicability of the attainder principle 
beyond formal criminal punishment was established well before Brown. Indeed, it has 
been a basic feature of Supreme Court case law for over a century. See supra Part ID. 
128. Romer, 1 16 S. Ct at 1631,  1632-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
129. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.2, 196 n.8 (1986). 
130. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending constitutional protection 
to use of contraception by unmarried couples). 
131.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Eisenstadt 
and reaffirming constitutional protection of abortion). 
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female - sodomy constitute de jure sex discrimination, in the same 
way antimiscegenation laws constituted de jure race discrimination? 
(This is surely what stone cold logic says.)132 
Even if Bowers could somehow stand as an anal sex case, what 
about oral sex? (Again, can male-female oral sex be criminalized? And 
if not, how can a ban on only male-male and female-female oral sex 
survive a sex discrimination challenge?) And what about petting below 
the waist? Or above the waist? Or kissing? Or handholding and hug­
ging? Or saying "I love you?" Did Bowers "unquestionably" apply to 
all this conduct?133 Justice Scalia's analysis of Bowers is not his finest 
hour. Indeed, sad to say, I find it the low point of Justice Scalia's distin­
guished decade on the Court. 
Justice Scalia makes three other big points in dissent. First, he 
claims that Amendment 2 "prohibits special treatment of homosexuals, 
and nothing more." 134 They are, for example, merely deprived of the 
ability to get a "special" law requiring insurance companies to ignore 
special health risks "associated with homosexuality (if there are any)" 
in setting premiums.135 But since heteros can get such laws qua heteros, 
what is at stake is equal treatment, not special favoritism. 
Second, Justice Scalia suggests that the inequality imposed -
forcing gays and bis to win their rights statewide while heteros can win 
locally - is a justified reaction to queers' special clout as a "politically 
powerful minority."136 They are organized; they "reside in dispropor­
tionate numbers in certain communities"; they "have high disposable 
income"; they "possess political power much greater than their num­
bers." 137 But much the same could be said - and in some times and 
places has been said - of Jews.138 Surely Justice Scalia would not al­
low Colorado to handicap Jews in elections. Footnote four of Carolene 
Products139 has been turned on its head; discreteness and insularity are 
now occasions for legally imposed disabilities. (Recall also that gays 
132. See supra note 7. 
133. See Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 
79 VA. L. REv. 1551, 1624-25, 1632-34 (1993); Halley, Closet, supra note 48, at 949. 
134. Romer v. Evans, 116  S. Ct 1620, 1630 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
135. 116  S. Ct at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
136. 1 16 S. Ct at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
137. 1 16 S. Ct at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
138. Cf. Yoshino, supra note 47 (discussing Nazi yellow stars for Jews and pink 
triangles for gays). 
139. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (sug­
gesting special judicial sensitivity to protect discrete and insular minorities against 
prejudice). For a discussion of the ways in which gays are both discrete and insular and 
yet also diffuse and anonymous, see Hunter, supra note 124, at 548; Yoshino, supra 
note 47. 
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sought only the benefit of equal discrimination laws that protected 
heteros too.) More generally, do we really trust government to "handi­
cap" elections? Incumbents have too much name recognition, so can 
Colorado keep them off the ballot, forcing voters to write them in? The 
Supreme Court said no in last year's term limits case.140 Cities are more 
organized, so can Colorado try to reapportion its legislature to offset 
this advantage by deviating from population equality? The Supreme 
Court said no in Reynolds v. Sims. 141 Even if Colorado thinks that 
Republicans win too much because they are fatcats - or that Demo­
crats win too much because the media is biased - Colorado cannot sin­
gle out a party by name for disfavored treatment. Even the Communist 
Party. That, once again, is the holding of United States v. Brown.142 
Finally, Justice Scalia offers two hypotheticals that probe the limits 
of the majority's suspicion of status-based laws. One derives from the 
Murgia143 case, which upheld "a mandatory retirement age of 50 for po­
lice officers."144 From one perspective, this law might seem status­
based: one cannot change the fact - the "trait" or "status" - of be­
ing over fifty. But from another, more sociological perspective, this law 
hardly singles out. Everyone, God willing, will someday reach this age 
and thus be subject to the disadvantage created by the law. It is hard to 
see how this law reflects revulsion or untouchability, a key sociological 
concern of both the Attainder and Equal Protection Clauses. So, even if 
courts look at the law with initial suspicion, it should pass muster eas­
ily. Justice Scalia's other example is a hypothetical "state law prohibit­
ing the award of municipal contracts to relatives of mayors or city 
councilmen."145 But once again, behind a veil of ignorance, this is a law 
that could apply to many persons in the future if their relatives happen 
to win office. Sociologically, no comparably thick veil insulates us from 
awareness of our sexual orientation. We are not all equally likely to 
wake up tomorrow and feel gay. Where the veil of ignorance is so thin, 
courts should be more suspicious. If a law prohibited Justice Scalia's 
relatives from serving as Court employees - while saying nothing 
about relatives of the other Justices - the nonattainder principle might 
140. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 1 15 S. Ct 1842, 1860-71 (1995). 
141. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
142. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
143. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per 
curiam). 
144. Romer v. Evans, 1 16 S. Ct 1620, 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is a rather 
striking coincidence that the Garland dissenters appealed to a remarkably similar hypo­
thetical. See Ex parte Garland, 71  U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 395-96 (1867) (Miller, J., dissent­
ing) (age limit for judges not unconstitutional). 
145. Romer, 1 16 S. Ct at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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well be implicated. This kind of "corruption of the blood" of relatives 
of a named person or class might raise the specter of animus and re­
quire careful judicial scrutiny. And if Justice Scalia sought a focused 
analysis of the difference between legitimate conflict-of-interest laws 
and illegitimate attainders, he need have looked no further than - you 
guessed it - United States v. Brown, which discusses this very issue at 
length.146 
In the end, it is hard to offer a charitable interpretation of a dissent 
that is so, well, uncharitable. Justice Scalia's shrill tone, his overconfi­
dence, his lapses of logic, his overreading of troubling cases like 
Bowers, and his resurrection of long-discredited cases like Davis141 lead 
one to want to wisecrack: at least he didn't cite Dred Scott with ap­
proval. But this impulse should be resisted. Justice Scalia is a jurist of 
extraordinary talent and principle, and so when he goes so wrong in 
Romer, we must wonder whether there is something in the issue of ho­
mosexuality that unsettles and unnerves, and causes many to forget their 
better natures. Perhaps there is something about this issue that leads 
good and smart people - in Colorado and on the Court - to say un­
characteristically bad and dumb things.148 If so, this may be one of the 
best reasons to think that the Court majority got it right after all. 
146. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 453-55 (distinguishing conflict of interest laws that 
"condemn all men" from attainders that single out specific, named group for suspi­
cion). I suggest that Brown articulates a veil-of-ignorance conception of sorts. For a 
nice discussion of how a veil-of-ignorance approach may help solve some tough equal 
protection issues, see Deborah Jones Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional 
Law: Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 739 (1986). 
Brown also suggests that political disabilities, and disabilities imposed because of 
political activities, are more likely to be seen as attainders. See 381 U.S. at 453-54. In 
this respect, First Amendment and equal protection concerns converge; and as Janet 
Halley has noted, courts should be especially attentive to this convergence in the area of 
gay rights. See Halley, Closet, supra note 48, at 968-76; see also Hunter, supra note 56. 
In Romer, Amendment 2 imposed a political disability - cutting off gays' and bis' po­
litical remedies at the local level - in response to their political visibility and success 
in Denver, Aspen, and Boulder. Justice Kennedy signals his sensitivity to this by citing 
- alongside Brown - United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), in which a federal 
law targeting communists was invalidated on First Amendment grounds. See Romer, 
1 16 S. Ct at 1628. 
Historically, of course, the Equal Protection Clause had nothing to do with voting 
and other "political" rights. The Clause was about nonpolitical "civil" rights of "per­
sons" (paradigmatically aliens) rather than "citizens." See Amar, supra note 32, at 754 
& n.18. And so here too the history of the Attainder Clause is especially apt in Romer. 
147. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 133 (1870), held that those who advocated polyg­
amy could be disenfranchised. 
148. For a similar observation about the nasty tone of Bowers itself, see MARY 
ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PoLmCAL DISCOURSE 
153-54 (1991); see also supra text accompanying notes 129-32 (criticizing Bowers's 
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VI. 
Since we began our journey with cutting words from Justice 
Scalia, it is only fitting that we end by returning to these words. Justice 
Scalia identifies the Court's principle - which he goes on to describe 
as "terminal silliness" - as follows: "[O]ne who is accorded equal 
treatment under the laws, but cannot as readily as others obtain prefer­
. ential treatment under the laws, has been denied equal protection of the 
laws."149 
The first reference to "equal treatment" is an obvious cheat. The 
question at hand is whether the treatment truly is equal, and this sort of 
question-begging will not do. Consider next the phrase "preferential 
treatment." This, too, is a cheat - doubly. First, it trades on the idea 
that since no one should have preferential treatment, those denied it 
cannot justly complain. Sometimes this is true. If the legislature passed 
a law that "Akhil Reed Amar shall be ineligible for a title of nobility," 
the concrete constitutional harm - singling a person out by name -
would be blunted by the fact that no real inequality would exist. No one 
under our Constitution is eligible for a title of nobility: that is the rule 
of Article I, Sections 9 and 10. But if the preferential treatment is some­
thing some others can get - "Akhil Reed Amar shall be ineligible for 
a private immigration bill or a suspension of deportation" - then the 
Constitution is violated. Just ask Jagdish Chadha. Second, Amendment 
2 on its face rendered queers ineligible not just for preferential treat­
ment, but for plain-vanilla, garden-variety antidiscrimination laws -
laws that, for example, protect heteros from being discriminated against 
as heteros. 
And so, properly recast, Justice Scalia's sentence boils down to 
this: " [O]ne who . . .  cannot as readily as others obtain [certain rights 
and privileges] under the laws, has been denied equal protection of the 
laws." To state this principle is to see not its terminal silliness, but its 
powerful logic and simple justice. 
logic and its analytically indefensible refusal to address the equal protection dilemma its 
approach creates). 
149. Romer, 1 16 S. Ct at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
